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The Case for the
Unstructured Audit Approach
Jerry D. Sullivan
Coopers & Lybrand
In their recently completed study of the audit methodologies of 12 large
accountingfirms—theBig Eight plus four of the next six largest firms—Cushing
and Loebbecke analyzed the firms in terms of the amount of structure in their
audit approaches and then classified the firms as "highly structured," "semistructured," "partially structured," or "unstructured." Based on the
characteristics of a structured approach, as that term is defined in the study
and discussed below, I hope that Coopers & Lybrand falls into the "partially
structured" category, which could also be called the "mostly unstructured"
category. It's interesting to note that when C&L revised its audit approach in
1969, to what was the forerunner of our present approach, we called it the
Uniform Audit Approach, thinking at the time that it was one of the most
structured approaches in the profession. Today, those same initials—UAA—
might be used to identify the "Unstructured Audit Approach."
Cushing and Loebbecke define a structured audit methodology as "a
systematic approach to auditing characterized by a prescribed, logical sequence
of procedures, decisions, and documentation steps, and by a comprehensive
and integrated set of audit policies and tools designed to assist the auditor in
conducting the audit." Using that definition, it's hard to be against a structured
audit approach; to favor an unstructured approach seems almost subversive. I
would like to suggest, however, that merely calling the two polar positions by
other names would go a long way toward removing what some symposium
participants probably view as the stigma of an unstructured approach. For
example, in addressing what are essentially the same issues, Dirsmith and
McAllister use the terms "mechanistic" and "organic" instead of "structured" and "unstructured." I would much rather be associated with an
approach that is viewed as organic than one that is referred to as unstructured.
On the other hand, I am sure that many auditors who take pride in their firms'
structured approaches would resent those approaches being referred to as
mechanistic.
There is a range of audit approaches between the two polar positions of
"structured" and "unstructured." I have already indicated that we thought
our approach was fairly structured when we first developed it. When I read the
Cushing-Loebbecke definition of a structured audit approach, I again thought
that our approach fit that definition. We always have believed that our approach
is systematic, comprehensive, and integrated—as those terms are typically
used. It's only when I see how far some firms have carried the notions of
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systematic, comprehensive, and integrated that I jump off the structure
bandwagon.

Classifying Firms' Policies
The Cushing-Loebbecke draft constructed a set of questions in an attempt
to identify a CPA firm's "potential policies for each audit process step" that
they identified in the study. They provided three alternative answers for each
question "which relate to the possible degree of structure a firm may feel is
appropriate." The set of answers that placed heavy emphasis on a structured
approach included the following possible policies (emphasis added):
1. All potential new clients would be investigated to the same extent.
2. All audit areas would be audited at a certain standard level of effort.
3. A totally substantive approach to an audit or to one audit area would
not be possible, and some detailed compliance tests would always be
required.
4. If the auditor wished to rely on internal control for one audit
objective for one type of transaction, internal control would have to
be relied on to meet all audit objectives for all types of transactions
and related accounts.
5. Statistical sampling would be used for all detailed tests.
6. Materiality would be allocated to various audit areas using a
statistical algorithm that totally ignored qualitative considerations.
7. Inherent risk would not enter into the determination of the scope of
audit procedures at all—that is, inherent risk would be set at 100
percent—presumably because the evaluation and assessment of
inherent risk are not susceptible to quantitative determination.
Those potential policies that underlie a structured audit approach seem to
suggest that the issue really isn't that of a structured approach versus an
unstructured approach, but rather that of structure versus judgment. The two
camps can also be divided into those auditors who believe that auditor judgment
should be replaced by structured, quantitative algorithms and those who
believe that the audit decision-making process cannot be reduced to a
quantitative model but will always require the exercise of considerable
judgment. Virtually every applied discipline faces this same issue of structure
versus judgment; only the words used to describe the debate vary. For
example, in the 1950s, the debate over the Federal Reserve's monetary policy
with regard to regulating the relationship between the money supply and the
level of economic activity was expressed in terms of "rules" versus "authorities," rules being the equivalent of structure and authorities being the
equivalent of the exercise of judgment on a continual basis by the Federal
Reserve Board and the Open Market Committee.
3

The Argument for Judgment
I don't believe that any audits are conducted based on the policies
suggested above as underlying a structured approach, nor do I believe that any
auditing firm has a set of policies, or even individual policies, that contain the
conclusions suggested by Cushing-Loebbecke as placing heavy emphasis on a
structured approach. I do not see that as the issue, however. The issue, as I
see it, is not where are we today? Rather, it is where are we going? Where will
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we be 10 years from now if we continue to strive to remove judgment from the
audit process, which seems to be a goal that some auditors support? Coopers
& Lybrand, and I'm sure this is true for all firms, seeks an audit approach that
helps the auditor perform an effective audit in the most efficient manner. We do
not characterize our approach as being either structured or unstructured; in
fact, we don't characterize it at all other than as the Coopers & Lybrand Audit
Approach, which I believe is far more advisable than having to defend or adhere
to one of the polar positions of structured or unstructured.
As part of our thinking about how to serve audit clients most efficiently,
C&L has classified its clients into a few market segments and has developed
different audit strategies for each of those segments—audit strategies that can
be changed as client conditions warrant. For example, our guidance for an audit
of a Fortune 500 client presumes that the control environment would support
auditor testing and reliance on controls; our guidance for audits of smaller
clients presumes that audit efficiency will be enhanced by using a purely
substantive test mode. In both cases, however, the methodology is sufficiently
flexible—that is, unstructured—to allow the engagement partner to follow an
alternative strategy if it is deemed to be the most efficient way of performing an
effective audit.

Audit Effectiveness
On the issue of audit effectiveness, my great fear is that a structured audit
approach that is based completely on quantitative algorithms is likely to
produce substandard audits, for a very simple reason—the incompleteness of
the linkage between the results of compliance tests and the nature, timing, and
extent of substantive tests. I do not believe that the technology currently
exists to enable auditors to determine with any reasonable level of assurance
what specific substantive tests should be performed and how much detailed
substantive testing should be done based on specified results of specific
compliance tests of internal controls. Even if inherent risk were set at 100
percent and even if no reliance were placed on the results of analytical reviews
in the substantive test phase of the audit—so that audit risk would be reduced
to an acceptable level solely through the application of compliance and detailed
substantive tests—I do not believe that an algorithm exists to permit a precise
and unarguable specification of the nature and amount of substantive testing
that should be performed, given the results of compliance test procedures in a
particular transaction cycle. Short of an arbitrary rule, no way exists of
determining, even on a statistical or probability basis, what the precise level of
a particular substantive test should be.
For example, if I concluded after applying statistical sampling to all key
controls over sales and cash receipts that I was 95 percent confident that the
true deviation rate for each control did not exceed 8 percent, what would that
tell me about the size of the sample for confirming accounts receivable? How
would that sample size change if sampling risk dropped to 1 percent? If the
upper deviation limit dropped to 6 percent? I don't think it can be done.
Auditors have neither the theory nor the technology to link the rate at which
control deviations occur and sampling risk in compliance testing with the
desired level of reliability in substantive testing. As a result, we cannot be
confident that an audit structured completely on quantitative algorithms will
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generate a sample size large enough to give us the level of reliability necessary
to comply with generally accepted auditing standards.
There is another extremely important aspect of the audit decision-making
process to which a structured approach will not contribute: the judgments the
auditor has to make, after the evidence has been obtained, about the
appropriate application of generally accepted accounting principles in the
client's particular circumstances. Decisions about whether the client has
properly accounted for sales with the right of return, potential inventory
obsolescence, and collectibility of receivables—to name just a few—are critical
to an effective audit but are not subject to a structured methodology or a
quantitative model.

Audit Efficiency
On the question of audit efficiency, the level of competition in the
profession today mandates that we not overaudit. If we do too much, either the
client pays for it and we risk losing the client to another firm, or we have to
absorb the unbillable hours. Neither prospect is attractive. Accordingly,
C&L—and I'm sure every other accounting firm—is extremely concerned
about performing audits as efficiently as possible, which means expending the
fewest possible hours to achieve the desired level of assurance. Let me
suggest that there are four ways in which an overly structured audit
methodology can lead to inefficiencies.
First, as I indicated earlier, a highly structured methodology largely
disregards the qualitative aspects of audit evidence that can and should have an
impact on audit judgments. Most auditors who espouse structure are heavily
quantitative and tend to ignore anything that can not be quantified. Among the
factors that are ignored are levels of inherent risk that are below 100 percent
and qualitative aspects of materiality that could serve to either increase or
decrease the audit effort in specific areas. Also ignored is knowledge about the
operation of controls that is obtained from nonsampling applications such as
observation and inquiry, and tests of controls over completeness (for example,
year-end reconciliations that are performed on a cumulative basis). I am not
suggesting that statistical sampling applications are necessarily inappropriate;
however, I am suggesting that sampling, and especially statistical sampling, is
not appropriate for much evidence of considerable audit significance. I simply
do not believe that an efficient audit can be performed if evidence of a
qualitative nature is ignored.
Second, the absence of linkage between substantive and compliance tests,
which I mentioned earlier, can lead to inefficient as well as ineffective audits. In
the absence of specific, quantitative guidance linking the nature and extent of
substantive tests to compliance testfindings,we are as likely to audit too much
as to audit too little, and overauditing in one area doesn't offset the effects of
underauditing in another area. The problems caused by the lack of precise
linkage exist in both the structured and unstructured approaches and are not
solved by increasing the level of structure in an audit. An unstructured
approach at least allows the auditor to consider information obtained about a
management assertion from tests other than the particular one under consideration. After all, accounts and tests of those accounts are interrelated; audit
evidence about any one assertion comes from multiple sources.
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Third, I do not believe that any of the structured methodologies take into
account, or can take into account, the audit efficiencies that ensue from what
C&L refers to as the "leveraging" of evidence obtained through compliance
tests. There are several ways to leverage evidence that C&L believes provide
the auditor with a means of obtaining, from sources other than compliance
tests, the necessary level of assurance about the continued and proper
operation of controls.

Leveraging Techniques
By way of incorporating the leveraging technique, the C&L approach
specifies that, to the extent possible and appropriate, some reperformance of
control procedures is a necessary aspect of compliance testing. For example,
assume an accounting control that consists of client personnel matching three
documents, following up on unmatched documents, and initialing the documents. In testing that control the auditor should not only look for the initials but
also reperform the matching. Similarly, the auditor should recalculate some
extensions and footings if that is the control being compliance tested.
Otherwise, the auditor has no assurance that the initials mean anything other
than that the employee knows how to write his or her initials. Having
reperformed the procedures and determined that the control operated on the
items selected, the auditor can then obtain a higher level of assurance about the
operation of the control by observing the operation of the procedure on
numerous occasions and by examining evidence, namely the employee's
initials, that the procedure was performed. In other words, once it has been
established that the employee's initials do mean something, then compliance
testing of those initials is appropriate, and that is a far less costly auditing
procedure than reperforming calculations or matching documents.
Similarly, C&L believes that the ability to rely on internal controls is
enhanced if those controls are exercised in an environment that includes
adequate supervisory review of their operation. We distinguish two different
groups of controls: basic controls, which have to do with the control objectives
of accuracy, validity, completeness, maintenance of account balances, and
physical security, and disciplinary controls, which monitor the basic control
procedures. Among the disciplinary controls is supervision. We believe that
conclusions about the effectiveness of controls that are reached from compliance tests performed before year-end can be extended throughout the year
if supervisory controls exist and can be tested to determine if they operated
during the untested period. Testing supervisory controls is relatively inexpensive; it usually involves observation and reviewing error reports, such as
computer printouts of rejected documents, that a supervisor may create and
file. Recognizing a hierarchy of controls—which I do not think is included in any
quantitative algorithm and probably can not be because there are so many
variables involved—permits C&L to conduct a more efficient audit by eliminating some (but not all) of the compliance tests involving reperformance that, I
believe, would otherwise be required for an audit in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards.
Perhaps an illustration will be useful. The primary objective of any audit
strategy is to provide the desired degree of protection against audit risk as
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efficiently as possible. Assume that the audit objective at hand is to be able to
conclude that recorded accounts receivable exist. A structured approach to
examining a client's accounts receivable to achieve audit satisfaction regarding
their existence is likely to center around the confirmation process, particularly
deciding the appropriate sample size and how to evaluate the sample results, as
a primary source of audit evidence. An unstructured approach would recognize
that in reality, and depending on the circumstances of the particular client and
its customers, the auditor may derive less comfort from the confirmation
process than is commonly thought. The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities addressed this issue in its Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations
(page 40):
The Commission's review of significant cases involving auditors disclosed several instances in which certain traditional audit steps did not
produce the assurances they were intended to provide. For example,
direct confirmation with parties outside the company is an important
method of substantiation of bothfinancialstatement amounts and other
management representations. However, in several cases, outsiders
either ignored incorrect information that was clearly shown in confirmations or actively cooperated with management in giving incorrect
confirmation. Constant attention should be given by both auditors and
the AICPA to the effectiveness of conventional auditing techniques and
to the development of new ones.
Accordingly, the auditor would be well advised to look to other sources of
evidence about the existence of the receivables. For example, the auditor
could look to secondary sources of evidence by testing the functioning of the
control system over shipping and billing, by determining by inquiry and
observation that there is proper segregation of duties and adequate and
continuing supervision over the basic controls in the revenue cycle, and by
determining through analytical reviews that there are no unexplainable variations in the pattern of recorded sales and receivables. The auditor might also
look to other primary sources of evidence for assessing the existence of an
account receivable, such as examining subsequent cash receipts. All of these
factors together may provide the necessary level of comfort for an auditor who
uses an unstructured approach; not all of them are likely to be encompassed by
the quantitative algorithm that is an integral part of a structured approach.
Stated simply, deciding whether the appropriate sample size for confirmation
should be 50 or 100 isn't nearly as important as the way the auditor integrates
the knowledge obtained from all the other audit procedures that are likely to be
performed.

The Role of Compliance Tests
Lastly, I noted earlier the Cushing-Loebbecke view that a compliance test
audit strategy is usually part of a highly structured audit methodology. C&L's
experience has been that, for many of our clients, an audit strategy of relying
on controls is often inefficient. With the exception of the largest industrial and
commercial companies and large- and medium-sized financial institutions, a
substantive test strategy, supplemented by little more than the minimum level
of understanding of the system that is required by the professional literature, is
likely to produce a more efficient audit. Our methodology is not locked in on
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this point, and we have not abandoned our long-standing attention to the
client's control system. Each situation, however, should be looked at individually, and the partner should determine whether a completely substantive test
approach would be more efficient for a particular client or a particular audit
area. C&L also believes that, in considering the costs and benefits of a
compliance test mode, the auditor must include cost and benefit factors that are
not related to the specific engagement, such as staff hiring, availability,
training, and retention. Even so, in many cases a strictly substantive test
approach is more economical. An audit methodology that biases the auditor
against reaching that conclusion is inappropriate, whether it's structured or
unstructured.

Decision Aids
The apparently heavy emphasis on quantitative algorithms that is part of a
highly structured approach seems to suggest that firms with structured
approaches provide more "decision aids" to staff auditors than do firms with
unstructured approaches. For example, one firm believes that the judgmentmaking process is enhanced by providing its auditors with a formula for
determining materiality. At C&L, we also provide decision aids to our staff—in
fact, we believe that Montgomery's Auditing is the profession's best decision
aid, and we have others as well—but we do so with great care, great restraint,
much training, and many caveats. Decision aids can enhance audit judgment but
can never replace it. Also, a decision aid should not be considered reliable
solely because it has been formulated based on past practices. A decision aid
that attempts to quantify a consensus without first ascertaining what the
correct judgment should have been may well give the auditor who applies it
what some have referred to as "the delusion of precision."

Conclusion
In summary, the research on error detection by Hylas and Ashton indicated
that in many instances the auditor's first knowledge of a financial statement
error came not through detailed tests that produced so-called hard audit
evidence, but rather through such relatively soft procedures as discussions
with the client, analytical reviews, and observation—hardly procedures that
lend themselves to a great deal of structuring or to quantitative algorithms.
That study suggests that the auditor's decision-making process is much more
complex than any quantitative model would suggest.
In their study on audit methodologies, Cushing and Loebbecke suggest that
many of the larger CPA firms have revised their audit methodologies in recent
years and that the changes have generally been toward more structured
approaches. They cite three motives for those changes: "(1) a need to
implement a consistent approach across a large practice; (2) a need to control
audit risk and audit costs more effectively; and (3) a desire to achieve a
distinguishable image in the market place." I think a strong case can be made
that those objectives can be achieved through an audit methodology that allows
the auditor, based on an understanding of the client and industry, to exercise
judgment in deciding what audit evidence is appropriate in the circumstances,
whether to compliance test or not, and whether to consider more nonquantifia4
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ble evidence than a highly structured methodology would accommodate. The
judgments the auditor must make in auditing under an unstructured approach
are no different from those, particularly valuation judgments, that the auditor
must ultimately make in assessing the overall fairness of financial statement
presentation in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles
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